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A country hardly known for the originality and diversity of its economic policies and ideas, Peru has long served as regional exemplar of growth without development, ill served by its myopic ruling cliques. If Peruvian intellectuals had other visions in mind, the region as a whole likely enjoys a rich but submerged economic tradition.
This book shows that unofficial traditions of "developmentalist" thought infused both elite and popular Peruvian culture, surviving, even thriving, during the country's age of outward-directed growth. Even among highly Westernized dominant classes, active contestation of regnant European practice and theory was commonplace—drawing imaginatively on Peruvian economic experience, nationalist twists of formal theory, serious concerns over export dependence, reasons of state, and a popular-folkloric ethos of productive and distributive justice.
Chapter 2 briefly surveys the influential nationalist thought, aristocratic and artisan, prevalent in Peru before the triumph of free trade at the advent of the guano age. Chapter 3 explores initial guano-age conflicts about diversification—around Juan Norberto Casanova's native industrializing ideology—and how its failure by the s colored liberal orthodoxy and dissenters over the next generation.
Attentive to mounting social costs of liberalism and looming nation-building tasks, their projects for railways, guano, and fiscal reform aspired to broaden domestic development, technology, sovereignty, and participation—the keys, in their minds, to reversing Peru's growing commercial imbalances. Such concerns found audible echoes in nationwide cries for modern communications and economies. Chapter 5, central in other ways, scrutinizes responses to the enveloping crisis of export exhaustion in the s: the reactivation of artisan politics in the era and a new developmental synthesis in the middle-class industrialism of Copello and Petriconi.
The conclusions seek to mend the gap between Peruvian ideas and experience and seek implications for study of Latin American social thought. Along the way many other thinkers are met, in what amounts to a genealogy of discontent with fictive prosperities. If little else, Peruvians fervidly imagined their thwarted development.
Colonial economic foundations collapsed as haciendas, mines, workshops, and trading towns slumped into abandon and disrepair. Plagued by some twenty-four major regime changes in as many years and countless smaller golpes and wider regional wars , Peru's anarchy was enough to blur all initial visions of nationhood.
Only the age of guano rescued Peru from its catastrophic age of caudillos—elevating the economic liberalism of the stable export state into a veritable act of national salvation. Yet the new Peru remained awash in the wakes, however muddled, of two prior even colonial currents of national economic thought.
Along with its caudillo skirmishes, postindependence Peru had just ended a bitter, three-decade battle over protectionism and free trade as the country struggled to define itself in the emerging global order. Volatile but largely forgotten economic-nationalist ideologies, interests, movements, and policies permeated its earliest regimes and first yearnings for development.
One strain was eminently elitist, the other profoundly popular, but together they smothered Peru's feeble first generation of theoretical free-traders. Of import here is the influence such crude national ideologies would exert on later developmentalist thinkers of the export  For these initial struggles, see Gootenberg, Between Silver and Guano.
Unlike purist Peruvian liberals—who could draw on a vast body of formal European theory—Peruvian dissenters had to piece together their own reflections and critiques out of hard economic experience and local ideas. This chapter, for all these reasons, provides a brief overview of Peru's precursory patrician and popular economic traditions and of the reactive and triumphant official liberalism of the s.
A Protection of Elites The protectionism of elites from to was in part a carryover of colonial corporate mentalities and partly a new defensive action wrapped after in the symbols of Western nationalism. All sectors of the Peruvian upper classes shared in this movement: the Lima commercial consulado merchant guild , shippers, coastal sugar planters, urban millers, finance cliques, provincial traders, landlords, and textile makers, as well as nationalist officers, diplomats, and politicians.
Their center of gravity, however, would remain the traditional geopolitical one of viceregal Lima. Stiff tariffs, import prohibitions, exclusions of foreign traders, discriminatory trade treaties, and national monopolies and privileges were among their primitive, homegrown practices.
There was also the historical example set by the mercantilist rise of Britain and France into great trader and industrial nations—that is, before they began preaching free trade to Peru. Because Peru's nationalist groundswell came by and large as a defensive move against both the novel competition of North Atlantic trades in the region and the first inklings of liberal trade theory, it was not especially coherent or versed in the tenets of emergent classical theory.
In  Gootenberg, Between Silver and Guano , ch. Yet the newfangled open trade theories of Bastiat, Say, and Smith—voiced by a handful of timid Peruvian liberals and crusading foreign consuls—were routinely dismissed by nationalist spokesmen as "inappropriate," "slavish," "ruinous," "self-interested," "hypocritical," and "unrealistic" for Peru.
Nor were Peruvian elites alone, for similar concoctions of nationalist passions and interests swept early economic debates in sister republics such as Mexico, Argentina, and Colombia. Rojas y Briones, diputado del soberano congreso nombrado por la provincia de Cajamarca Lima, pam.
Garrido, trans. Garrido, oficio mayor y tesorero interno del departamento de Ayacucho Ayacucho, Actions spoke louder than words—and to a large degree, interest lapsed in all grand schemes as statesmen coped with the quotidian traumas of meeting imaginary budgets and paying for real wars. Throughout the era the few hundred surviving top national merchants patently resisted openings to freer trade and the material lures of the two dozen or so liberal foreign houses in their midst.
Constraints of every sort fell on the port's overseas shippers and retailers. The contrast could not be sharper with the eagerly internationalist Peruvian merchants of the guano age. The organized consulado's timely fiscal and administrative aid to Lima's ephemeral state allowed officials and militarists to deflect incessant foreign free-trade pressures against Peru's web of commercial restrictions and navigation acts.
In this long campaign a host of related coastal farmers joined forces against invading foodstuffs: foreign flour, tobacco, rice, lard, wine. These early defenders of regional markets contrast with the agrarian export oligarchy that would dominate Peruvian agriculture by the later half of the guano age. Andean traders and hacendados were mainly out to sustain time-honored interior trade routes or to protect their obrajes, the scattered colonial-style wool and cotton manufactories of the highlands.
Provincials proved remarkably adept in s political bids to stem the flood of industrial textiles from Britain and the United States, at times weaving complex arguments for the factory cause. To sympathetic congresses, spokesmen wrapped their concern in Peru's burning desire for national "industry," though the inefficient and primitive obrajes were a dying breed. Guano-age politicians became anything but industrial sympathizers.
Consuls in Lima U. Ministers to Peru T52, vols. H-8, Tribunal del Consulado Republicano , or Sec. There were two types of early free-traders in Peru, apart from the ever active and ever ineffectual resident U. The first, a distant regional group, were Arequipan merchants and landed classes, who opposed the centralist north's Chilean trade designs and welcomed British traders into their realm.
But notoriously rebellious southerners remained regionally enmeshed and could neither conquer nor influence the Lima state, though try they did. Often linked with the long-suffering Ministry of Finance, they embraced a form of free trade.
Peru would reap the fiscal rewards of moderate revenue tariffs and reduced contraband. They could authoritatively quote Turgot, Say, Smith, Malthus, and Bentham and cogently discuss the scary example of monopolistic Spanish policy, using Humboldt's and Juan and Ulloa's renowned histories. For internationalist group, see J. Pando Lima, pam. Vidaurre Boston, pam.
At any rate these topsy-turvy depression years were no time for incubating long-term liberal experiments. In the early s core Peruvian elites began a wrenching but surprisingly rapid transition to laissez-faire and free trade as cornerstones for the state and economy.
Clearly, the advent of the guano trade gave them some push by providing new arenas for accumulation, public finance, and imported goods. Their conversion also coincided with expanding commerce and shrinking tariffs throughout Latin America and across the North Atlantic economy.
But just as critical were Peruvian geopolitical realignments and shifts in the dynamics of national state building, especially in defining this liberalism's special successes, peculiarities, and boundaries. In highly complex developments Peru's final and worst round of civil wars in the early s discredited traditional statism by fully associating it with caudillo breakdowns and predation. Between and nightmarish army fiscal demands nearly destroyed the national commercial guild and completely sank their varied developmental projects, such as the treasured trade monopoly to Asia.
The protection of elites had become its opposite and had failed on every front. In contrast, free trade now offered a financial solution for orderly and progressive state building guano advances, a professionalized military. It now offered Lima merchants their long-sought recovery as a class, in which the externally funded "consolidation" of defaulted caudillo-era debts would play a notable role.
Ideologically, the minimalist design of laissez-faire rule promised relief and shelter from the arbitrary and destructive misrule of statist militarists. In short, desperate Lima elites embraced free trade as a classic form of civilizing doux commerce. Castilla and his cohorts viewed freer commerce as a way to co-opt and integrate the long rebellious south with Lima and lure similarly devastated provincial oligarchs to their national project, which it shortly did.
A final reaction against protectionist politics would come with the frightful miniclass struggles launched by Lima artisans later in the decade. Peru's victorious new breed of post liberals always reminded their class that any return to exclusionism was tantamount to regress to the anarchic turmoil that had threatened their very class existence in the early republic.
To be sure, these imperatives coincided with novel and more adroit varieties of free-trade thought, hammered in by a youthful new generation of liberals during the formative political economy debates of Like Peruvian nationalist thought, this was never just an import. Theoretically, it preached full-blown comparative advantage though guano made it a natural , new freedoms for consumers and merchants, and a less taxing treasury.
Liberals now envisioned more decentralist and capitalist developments; expanding trade would tie together the nation, feed the toiling classes, unleash capitalist spirits, and peaceably revolutionize civil society. Peruvians became conversant with the latest in radical French free trade Blanqui, Chevalier , though Bastiat and Say always remained most popular. More easily read, French notions of free trade, that solvent of feudalism and catalyst of class harmony, also seemed more compatible to wary elites than did the Scottish enlightenment's dreary and frightful vision of inevitable class conflicts.
But more than fresh thinking, aggressive free-traders invoked new practical heroes; Peel, Huskisson, and Cobden symbolized modern, courageous, and at last! A major firsthand account for is Manuel de Mendiburu, "Memorias del Gen. Mendiburu" MS. For "sweet commerce" idea, see Albert O. Dunoyer," Feb. Socialist ideas and proletarian revolts were read as good arguments to never industrialize; Peru was a land free of polluting interests, thankfully free to pursue a purer and purifying liberalism.
Though sometimes intellectual name-droppers, Peru's new political economists now suffered little initial resistance from enthusiastic elite audiences. Mired in shadowy negative struggles with "restrictive" illusions, a positive, if unchanging, growth theory is also discernible over the next three decades. A review here will elucidate the backdrop from which distinctive developmental stances would emerge. Commerce—always and fully unimpeded—was the spur to heightened consumption, production, and capital formation.
Foreign trade, following painful but unavoidable adjustments, was to serve as Peru's market-widening engine of growth. Specialized export-import trades cheapened subsistence, boosted savings, and induced efficiency; more dynamically, trade multiplied new tastes, expectations, technologies, productivity, and mounting merchant capital investments. In social terms, "moral effects" would register in capitalist and market mentalities, the progressive "spirit of association," among entrepreneurs and workers alike.
Free traders privileged the visible impact of commerce over "fictitious" productions—in many ways first formalizing a split between external and internal spurs to development. One surmises an unarticulated "vent for surplus" principle at work. Emilio Dancuart, comp. Investments in commerce, mining, and export agriculture would accelerate capital formation and the liberal associative spirit. Peru enjoyed outstanding natural and cost advantages in these activities.
Scientific Ricardian comparative advantage, if hinted at, did not gain currency until the turn of the century. A Malthusian spirit colored liberal convictions of Peru as a grossly high-wage and sparsely settled land although peasant populations were in fact briskly expanding throughout the century. Native wage labor was difficult to find, however, and liberals read this shortage as the key reason never to misallocate capital and labor resources in futile and unprofitable manufactures.
Instead, populations would grow over time through the beneficent effects of trade on living standards and the wider attraction of liberal policies for foreign workers or the more visible hand of promoting skilled European—i. Once Peru amassed its surplus capital, labor, and skills, then and only then might a natural transition occur to more complex and diversifying activities.
Unfit for entrepreneurial tasks, save in the all-important guano trade, all that was needed from government, following Smith's maxim, was less meddling and lighter taxes. In fact, in Peru this lean state faced some pretty big tasks: lifting the innumerable colonial-era blocks to private property and practice, replacing them with effective capitalist judicial and bureaucratic institutions, balancing bloating budgets, creating much-needed infrastructure in roads, ports, schools, and public safety, and promoting science and immigration.
On paper, at least, liberals admitted no conflict between the ideals of export and civil liberalism. By the s, views codified in a series of national economics textbooks, e. In any case, by this official developmentalism of the export age was set. Two fundamental continuities from fading elite nationalism, nonetheless, would mark or distort the export liberalism of the guano age.
Foremost was the state's guano monopoly itself, rapidly organized amid caudillo turmoil in and inspired by the passing military-consulado nexus and its traditional fiscal estancos. Guano-age Peru's brand of commercial and fiscal liberalism remained fueled by a uniquely statist, even nationalist institution, an irony never lost on vociferous overseas critics. At first necessarily reliant on British and French carriers and finance, the Peruvian government basically owned and worked the country's entire export sector.
They pursued price-setting policies abroad; bargained hard for contractor profit shares reaching 60 percent; and deployed these funds for a lavish expansion of state activities some eight to tenfold between and The costs of laissez-faire—namely, unbridled import competition, de facto centralization, and paltry welfare and development measures—were borne mainly by the artisans, petty retailers, workers, regional societies, and forgotten peasant majorities of Peru. Needless to say, the material impact of Peru's export liberalism was not always congruent with the libertarian and republican ideals that accompanied its march elsewhere in the Western world.
As a legacy of its colonial heyday, Lima boasted a diverse crafts sector, overwhelmingly devoted to finished luxuries for its Europeanized bureaucratic and merchant aristocracy. In the late s such light manufacturing still encompassed some even hundred to nine hundred modest workshops a quarter of the city's incorporated establishments , produced a fourth of taxed municipal business incomes, and employed perhaps three thousand to five thousand skilled apprentices, dayworkers, and black slaves.
Organized into forty or so traditional guilds, most crafts specialized in ornate goods such as fine furniture, jewelry, dresses, saddlery, lace, buttons, carriages, watches, lamps, and such exotic Lima specialties as the saya y manto woman's cape; others plied motley smith and repair trades or processed foodstuffs from liquors to lards for the urban market. All these producers intertwined with the hundreds of petty creole shopkeepers and hawkers dominating the city plazas and streets.
In this respect urban craftsmen were worlds apart from Peru's much larger and more diffuse rural artisanry, the tens of thousands of Andean-style peasant weavers and hewers of crude household necessities who stayed well out of political sight and range. As social distances shrank in Lima during the postindependence depression, guilds became useful to urban notables in varied forms of political mobilization, such as staged elections, caudillo standoffs, and standing militias, and in such vital municipal services as policing runaway slaves and rabid dogs.
Moreover, the intricate protectionism of artisans converged with that of early elites. Guild protectionism, too, was eminently defensive. Artisans sought to shelter, through high tariffs and outright prohibitions, their light craft manufactures. Their prime concern lay in promotion of skilled labor and employment, not in improved technology, efficiency, scale, or industrialism Lima still had no factories to speak of. To the guilds, foreign merchants and crafts—such as the novel, mass-produced, up-market imports that flooded Lima in the late s—were unnecessary, ruinous, unfair, and downright unpatriotic.
Such competition was forcing Peru's long-suffering model citizens into lives of vagrancy, vice, and political mayhem—a most frequent and threatening motif. Craft leaders invoked the standard of the "honorable," "humble," and "democratic" artisan.
They vaunted republicanism and popular education. Their earnest work ethic and simple skills were assets to the nation, and their political and fiscal health a prop to republicanism, which obviously had to heed the needs of "the people. Autodidactic craft leaders could also list their favorite Spanish economists, but mostly they railed against "imitative systems," "theories applied to other countries"—but just not right for conditions in Peru.
As in elite discourse, countless special "exceptions" took precedence over the finer dictates of free trade. Hardly radicals—their very existence hinged on upper-class patrons—artisans profusely apologized for their "affronts to the lights of the century.
Besides stiff craft tariffs, popular welfare would also be advanced by lower-cost mass necessities for instance, imported foodstuffs, tools, and typical manufacturing inputs such as foreign cloth. Peru's responsive tariff structure thus provided artisans with the advantages of what is now termed effective protection. It was the state's "duty" to support native "industry," as aptly expressed in frequent military supply contracts for fancy uniforms and the like.
Because craftsmanship centered on quality items for a remnant colonial aristocracy, artisans continued to be obsessed with taste considerations rather than cost. They boasted the superior quality of home goods over flimsy, cut-rate imports. Hierarchic guild masters tried, without much success, to carry on as well with restrictive guild statutes, which supposedly regulated quality, training, and entry, but they warmly welcomed the trickle of new European craft immigrants to Lima.
To portray such popular philosophy as a consistent, much less viable, conception of "development" would be an exaggeration. Much like elite nationalism, it basically thrived on hard times. Still, this amalgam of petit bourgeois notions proved highly workable in early republican politics.
Peddling their ideas with timely petitions and protests, Lima guilds had won tariffs of 50 to 90 percent by the late s, followed by a host of full import prohibitions during Peru's "prohibitions era" of In their campaigns guild leaders could exploit their business and political connections to elite merchants and suppliers. Other aspects of their program found their way into policy such as pro-artisan immigration law , and even after textile and  Comercio, 23 Sept.
Richest comparative work is Luis A. Guilds cut deals with caudillos, candidates, and political clubs and packed the chambers to cheer or jeer congressional delegates. However, by the mid s—amid Peru's emerging import prosperity and solidifying elite state—artisan influence had begun to wane. By it lay totally shattered in the victory of a strict Manchesterian free-trade tariff and its legislated containment of artisan initiatives.
Defeat came after Lima's guilds launched a dramatic campaign to impose last-ditch protectionism on the guano economy's recovering consumer class. Following long, fiery, and shifting debates and initial concessions to the guilds, the struggle ended in a striking and lasting backlash against all artisan protectionism.
Peru's revitalized import capacity allowed urban consumers access to a new range of luxuries, and such Europeanized elites naturally preferred the imported variety denied over three decades. Over the long haul, traditional artisan dependence on an upscale clientele had thus turned self-defeating.
Emphasis on fine taste was easily turned on its head by liberals into loud public derision of the "miserable," "backward," and "crude" styles of Lima crafts. New liberals also exposed artisan claims to represent the true "national" interest. For example, by the late s French, Italian, and English craftsmen had become a visible force in Lima, running about a fifth of the city's most prominent and prospering workshops—as decrepit national crafts fell to under a fifth of Lima's total business economy.
Artisan democratic pretensions were belied by their enthusiasm for guild stratification and market restrictions, now deemed atavistic and "oppressive" in a burgeoning metropolis beset by price inflation. Preserving rote native skills appeared increasingly anachronistic as awareness spread about the North Atlantic revolution in machinery and modern factory production.
Inert guilds, in fact, had never moved to produce in mass for the low-cost markets, a bias enshrined by pro-artisan tariff structures. When they began to rail publicly against Lima's first factory experiments in , nostalgic artisans exposed themselves as out of step with the nineteenth century. Most important, artisan political economy now looked like a concoction of narrow, ad hoc interests. Unable to set productive priorities, it simply led to squabbling, beggar-thy-neighbor demands rather than any coherent growth strategy.
This familiar politicizing spiral was dramatized for elites during the tariff struggles, when initial artisan protests sparked an escalating and conflicting competition for support by every imaginable group jeopardized by the emergent export economy. Liberals claimed that this process, if not contained, would lead Peru to a closed economy—a veritable "China" or "Paraguay.
But the last straw, in early , had been an unseemly radical artisan political outburst. Sensing their growing isolation, and seizing the Jacobin slogans of Europe's , renegade guild leaders smeared the Lima "idle aristocracy" of wealth and the hostile new liberals.
Others called on artisans to elect their own "popular" governments and do away with all unresponsive politicians: "We want a republican government that watches over the country's industry, that provides guarantees to the guilds.
We are the majority and power resides in us. Seone, 19 Aug. Last sympathies for artisans evaporated among Lima's guano nouveaux riches. The task was to keep dangerous artisans out of their plutocratic republic. The s thus began with a rapid marginalization of artisans from economic policy, civil politics, and the fruits of recovery.
True, guilds received concessions for subsistence costs, some residual protection, and eventually such welfare measures as a school of arts. And artisans would also fare better with prosperity than would impoverished native retailers pushed aside by expanding foreign shops. But guilds clearly perceived how the coalescing civil institutions of Lima were out to bypass them; they lamented how the liberal age was to belong exclusively to merchants, well-heeled consumers, and the propertied classes.
They felt expendable—and indeed they were. Guilds retreated into a consciously depoliticized and inward-looking politics of mutual aid—or exploded in desperate acts of Luddite despair, such as Lima and Callao's fiery protectionist riots of Yet their plight, their failures, their aspirations, and even bits of popular folk protectionism would come to haunt Peru as the guano age progressed—when Peru's fiscal crisis unfolded amid a revitalized artisan politics of the s.
Then, a new generation of elite skeptics, moved like the first by politics, national interest, and perilous trades, would at least meet the artisans halfway. Grillo," 27 Dec. These themes are explored much further in ch. Lima, waning center of colonialism, had seen only further disasters after independence: the ordeals of rampant militarism, political disintegration, bankruptcy, and economic despair.
Factionalized and conservative elites expressed at best a confused national purpose; Peruvians remained distanced or hostile about an uncertain connection to the world outside. By the old imperial capital of Lima seemed a ghost of its former splendor, still slipping in population under 55, as well as wealth, glory, and power. But fortunes changed completely in —with the European rediscovery of guano. The easily mined mountains of bird dung on the nearby Chincha Islands lay right within Lima's grasp.
Peru's perceptive generals swiftly declared the fertilizer a national monopoly and in a few years reconsolidated their state at Lima. By the fabulous age of guano had arrived. Guano riches worked many wonders in the first decade.
All this was good news to Lima's suffering elites. Under Castilla's steady tutelage, they could dress like good Europeans, rebuild fallen family fortunes, demand proper deference, and properly debate their national future. Only artisan malcontents clung to misgivings.
In direct and sublime ways Peru opened itself to the world. By its traditionally isolated stance had been fully superseded by the most vigorous liberal commercial order of the region. This chapter, however, focuses on early dissenters in these transformations—those who from the start questioned the type of diversity and prosperity imagined by exports alone.
Failing to slow the march to liberal hegemony, they still left a mark. Brief experiments with this idea from to profoundly affected liberal and dissenting thinkers over the next generation. The interest swept Lima in two contradictory waves: first, in widespread fascination with industrialism as integral to Peru's newfound progress; second, in a dogmatic and phobic class reaction to elite industrial possibilities.
Industrial Movements Peru had endured its share of promanufacturing policies in the decades since independence, but these had been directed at light urban crafts or the equally backward rural obrajes, neither of which held  On free-trade transformations, see Gootenberg, Between Silver and Guano , ch.
Platt, ed. By the late s emphatic provincial campaigns to revive colonial-style factories or country weavers had failed. Not a single manufactory of Cuzco, Ayacucho, or La Libertad survived; they had been felled, it appears, by imports of industrial cottons legal or otherwise , incessant civil turmoil, labor flight, and the broader regional depressions of the postindependence era. But the year , tail end of Peru's turbulent caudillismo, also marked a turning point in industrial perspectives, projects, and possibilities.
The precarious social peace forged by Castilla's national pacification, sped along by new regional alliances and guano, allowed Peru a fresh start at civil politics: the little-studied "first civilismo. Amid lively revived debates on how to stabilize and organize the nation, another polemic broke out over timeworn issues of industrial promotion. That failure had left the Peruvian countryside "agonizing" in poverty, vagrancy, vice, and unrest—even in the dreaded "fear of matrimony.
A desperate if eloquent nostalgia pervades these pleas, harking back to an imagined golden age of colonial artisanry. In Huamanga "from its capital to its  Gootenberg, Between Silver and Guano , ; there is still no adequate study of final obrajes. All was lost in Peru's "unlimited freedom of commerce. But by this approach could not wash with a worldly congress. Instead, throughout the debates two issues seemed to raise wider concerns. First, delegates voiced the notion that industrial employment might extinguish the social malaise that had long inflamed Peru's smoldering caudillo struggles.
Prospering industries would bolster the fragile peace. This was to become a recurrent political connection in the next generation. Second, delegates keenly perceived that Peru's newfound calm itself raised prospects for all sorts of economic ventures, as decades of chaos had sabotaged all previous hopes of reviving industries and agriculture. Liberty, stability, and industry marched together. To be sure, a handful of deputies, among them Cuadros and Urrutia, hurled classical free-trade arguments against the agitated Andean traditionalists.
They paraded pragmatic principles of natural or cost advantage, though, in a sense, these also had long been a commonsense understanding of Peru's specialized colonial heritage. The lesson of fading colonial artisanries and futile crusades to save them was that in Peru manufacturing could simply never "work.
Yet in this still remained the minority response; many outspoken deputies and senators confidently rejected the liberal recipe. Liberty was not yet synonymous with commerce. Amid this debate, in late August an influential group of coastal delegates led by Tirado and Vega suddenly countered both traditional  Speech of Dep.
Cabero, Comercio , 23 Aug. Instead of engaging in fruitless efforts to revive archaic manufactories or to return to narrow dependence, Peru needed to develop the same kind of modern factories now transforming England and the United States.
Infatuation with the machine had just gripped the Peruvian imagination. Such revolutionary industries should be based on the latest imported plants and located in the coastal consumer heartland. Though this argument signaled shifts to Lima interests, it was also cogent; transport costs were a daunting obstacle to any form of sierran development, the theme codified by later civilist writers.
The intrinsic power of machinery, peace, and capital was infinitely greater than ineffectual restrictive laws. Free trade, that "beautiful theory," needed to be applied, but in gradual ways, safeguarding the "health of the people.
In effect, this debate also marked the end of Peruvian hopes in colonial obrajes and rural industry generally. Their last promotional props some unfulfilled military contracts disappeared with little protest the following year. But equally striking, in no one bothered to regard rising guano prosperity as a new hindrance to Peruvian diversity or industrialism; on the contrary, it represented a technological threshold.
By October congress had hammered out its draft law to promote modern factories in Lima. It included generous awards to factory pioneers and for immigrant technicians and workers, such as technology and market privileges, duty-free inputs, and long-term tax breaks.
For era's conflictual industrial concessions policy, see Gootenberg, "Artisans and Merchants," Businessmen grasped the opportunities afforded by peace, the consumer revival, and such highly publicized privileges and support. An eminently elite enterprise, in many ways this movement was counterposed to traditional artisan and weaver protectionism.
For five years Peru's self-proclaimed "infant industrialists" were to garner the wholehearted backing of all top officials and even prominent free-traders. In glasswares and utensils the merchant Jorge Moreto had already established his protected factory by In the Bossio brothers revived it, moved it to Callao, and greatly expanded its product range while offering new shares and bringing in skilled European managers.
Both projects received government monopolies and subsidies, Sarratea, for example, in his spacious, rent-free factory. Eugenio Rosell, another trader, opened a factory for candles and a wide array of whale oil by-products. The government itself invested heavily in its naval foundry at Bellavista, established in Part technical academy, Bellavista was to train mechanics forty-three annually for private business and to earn its keep through private contracts for making and repairing sophisticated machinery.
Using a mechanized plant shipped in from Paterson, New Jersey, the owners envisioned a factory with a capacity of one hundred looms and twenty thread machines. They would soon move to employ five hundred workers with an annual production of ten million yards—that is, virtually all of Peru's cloth import bill. The third amigo, the less well known Cagigao, was soon replaced by the importer Modesto Herce. The three-story, water-driven mill, located in the heart of the city in the legendary colonial Casa de la Perricholi , was well underway by Some workers, mainly destitute women and children, commanded the bustling machines.
What clearly was shaping here by was a concerted effort to legitimize an elite industrial lobby at the advent of the guano age. The press campaign, particularly the effusions from Peru's official gazette, was far out of proportion to the handful of factories underway. It was as if modern industry were the foremost symbol of a progressing Peru—and, at last, a respectable alternative to its increasingly disreputable artisans. A still active senator Cabero preached about the "national factories of paper and cottons having a hand to not fail in the cradle.
News and endorsements rapidly spread to Cuzco, which called for "many imitators," especially in the interior; Peruvian students abroad analyzed the factories in their theses. Max Radiguet, Lima y la sociedad peruana ; rpt. Tauro, ed. Pacheco, later a key civilist legal thinker, presents even-handed discussions of trade theories Colbert to Ricardo ; the thesis makes an exemplary source on transmission of economic ideas.
The packet was placed in the refurbished Museo Nacional—where future generations would surely flock to admire the founders of industrial Peru. Guano into Factories? Juan Norberto Casanova's hopeful page tract was a formal expression of this moment and interest. Indeed, portions of the book first appeared in the government press. A larger agenda, set out in the preface, was to encourage other national capitalists to join in the industrial movement, in cottons and many other lines.
The audience—Lima's men of capital and influence—was obvious; the mystery was how they would read Casanova. It brims with the United States's recent experience, which Casanova recounts from his three visits in the mid s to New Jersey firms—a fascination that would echo in many emerging voices. No hints are found of the coeval infant-industry ideology of Friedrich List or, for that matter, of Hamilton , though his work more or less replicates the argument, minus European statism. As with most dissidents from regnant liberal theory, Casanova necessarily embraces relativism and improvisation.
Political economy "is subject to such a grand diversity of contexts, countries, customs, habits, laws, and necessities, that we must modify principle—there are so very few absolutely true theories. Yet a programmatic even psychological message runs through this long technical and cost survey: strong rejoinders to traditional and local claims that Peru lacks the basic "elements" for industrialization.
Casanova must awaken Peru's dormant and discouraged industrial entrepreneurs. Many surmise that Peru cannot efficiently muster the requisite cheap labor, raw materials, expertise, power, internal markets, surplus capital, and so on. A subsidiary theme, worked out in lengthy reviews of machine innovations, is the transformative power of modern technology, another fascination of later writers.
It is as if the mechanical marvels of the industrial revolution alone have now superseded traditionally fixed cost calculations of trade. Moreover, after balancing raging European debates on the working class, Casanova endorses the "moral" force of machinery on popular society.
Casanova repeatedly spins another appealing politic theme: how virtually all national groups—agriculturalists, the poor, capitalists, the state—will harmoniously benefit from integrated national industries. He even imagines the day when Peru, "so abundant in mines," will construct industrial plants on its own, a wishful notion of later writers.
He personally encourages other Peruvian businessmen to compete with his textile concern, "six or seven more factories. The country remains anxious with memories of incurable discontent, revolt, civil wars. Industrialization, through its massive and disciplining employment, secures order. Individual well-being is the great guarantor of conduct. Despite such propitious industrial conditions in Peru, Casanova must underline the need for sustained government support, the object of his crusade.
He finds working and legal precedents in Peru's past efforts to promote obrajes, guids, and colonial agriculture. But public support for modern factories that cheaply supply growing markets, argues Casanova, is worthy beyond comparison. The obrajes and handweavers made a "miserable" form of industry, and Casanova suggests that local tailors may well suffer harm from factories, given the artisans' penchant for using cheaper imported cloth.
XII: 2. Everson, E. Luciano, D. Walicek, D. May, Universidad de Puerto Rico, Cayey. X: Marzo Universidad de Puerto Rico en Arecibo, University of Puerto Rico at Rio Piedras, Video Savidge, Leigh and James Chankin, directors. Xenon Pictures, Brief Biographical Notes: Born in New York in , moved to Puerto Rico at a young age, and lived in Adjuntas, which he considers his hometown, and where he went to high school.
Possesses a B. Here he has taught a wide range of courses from Basic English to upper echelon courses such as Phonetics, Seminar in Linguistics, Discourse and Grammar among others.
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Just off the Pacific coast of Peru, the right mix of natural conditions—the fertile depths of the Humboldt current, the billions of tiny fish it spawns, the millions of gulls on their trail, the arid specks of land called the Chinchas—left, over the millennia, staggering offshore deposits of bird dung.
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