Kraken crypto radar Архив
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Автор: Kazraktilar | Category: Kraken crypto radar | Октябрь 2, 2012
This speculation compare, among others, Yermack, ; Glaser et al. Not only are they not widely accepted in exchange for goods and services, but they are not widely used to price things, and attempts to provide prices are unintuitive 3 Yermack, Issues currently associated with the term Beyond these debates about the validity of the original use of the term cryptocurrency, the term has been destabilised by the proliferation of alterations to traditional cryptocurrency systems.
Peters et al. In public-permissionless systems every participant in the network node can read transactions and write others to the ledger. For public-permissioned systems, only authorised nodes can write. In private permissioned systems, finally, even reading is restricted to authorised nodes. An example of a recent development trend holding true to the aim of replacing trust by cryptographic proof found in archetypal cryptocurrencies compare Nakamoto, ; and Genkin et al.
They are closely related to archetypal cryptocurrencies and replicate their public-permissionless setup of rights to read and write. As a consequence of their focus on privacy, however, they are leading to rising concerns with respect to anti-money-laundering and law enforcement compare Tziakouris, ; or Ferrari, The broad trajectory in recent years, however, has been to decrease the centrality of cryptography in the respective implementations. Even permissioned payment systems run by corporations but still called cryptocurrencies entered the stage.
With traditional business starting to experiment with the technology inspired by Bitcoin, system requirements—and with it the respective security setups and use of cryptography—changed. The economic design for these more centralised payment systems led to the reestablishment of trusted third parties or intermediaries for token creation to a certain degree.
While many novel cryptocurrencies are far from the crypto-anarchist roots of archetypal token designs, the general idea of the replacement of trust in institutions or their internal governance mechanisms by cryptography still plays a role in all cryptocurrency designs.
However, given that even fiat bank payments use cryptography for security, mere reliance on cryptography for security should not enter a definition of cryptocurrencies. Not all development strands feature the objective of proposing general purpose monetary tokens.
First-layer tokens e. Ether that underlie smart contract platforms 6 e. Ethereum , and informally even second-layer tokens tokens running on respective platform are called cryptocurrencies, but they exist first and foremost to activate smart contracts rather than aiming to provide a payment solution for goods and services more generally see Bartoletti, There are very different types of stablecoins, and recently several frameworks have tried to unify and abstract existing stabilisation techniques e.
With more complex stablecoin designs the legal case is not always clear, but from an economic standpoint their stability in purchasing power might contribute to an increase in their adoption as money in the future. Conclusion Many scientific publications simply assume the meaning of the term cryptocurrency to be common knowledge or, at most, sketch it roughly. The neologism cryptocurrency is unstable in its meaning, and is applied to systems with diverse technical architectures and governance systems.
Nevertheless, one way to unify the diverse uses of the term is to define it by some common intent among those who claim it, rather than by the diverse means via which that intent is enacted, and regardless of whether the intent is achieved in practice. We find that cryptocurrency systems are unified by being intended to host a general or limited-purpose medium-of-exchange, a cryptocurrency, using infrastructure that replaces trust in institutions by cryptography to varying degrees.
To make the term more useful in public discourse, cryptocurrency should be coupled with specifying classifications from economic e. References Aggarwal, D. Quantum attacks on Bitcoin, and how to protect against them. Blockchain-based smart contracts: A systematic mapping study. Brenner, K. Rohloff, J. Bonneau, A. Miller, P. Ryan, V.
Teague, A. Bracciali, M. Sala, F. Jakobsson Eds. Springer International Publishing. Bitcoin: Medium of exchange or speculative assets? Governance in the blockchain economy: A framework and research agenda. Journal of the Association for Information Systems, 19 Global cryptoasset regulatory landscape study [Report].
In search for stability in crypto-assets: Are stablecoins the solution? Paper No. European Central Bank. Schloss Dagstuhl—Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik. Untraceable Electronic Cash. Goldwasser Ed. Speculative bubbles in Bitcoin markets? An empirical investigation into the fundamental value of Bitcoin. Economics Letters, , 32— GARCH modelling of cryptocurrencies. Journal of Risk and Financial Management, 10 4 , Demystifying Stablecoins: Cryptography meets monetary policy. Queue, 18 1 , 39— The crypto-currency.
The New Yorker, Blockchain and the law: The rule of code. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. Blockchain technology: Transforming libertarian cryptocurrency dreams to finance and banking realities. Computer, 50 9 , The regulation of crypto-assets in the EU — investment and payment tokens under the radar. Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 27 3 , — Privacy in Decentralized Cryptocurrencies. Communications of the ACM, 61 6 , 78— Bitcoin-asset or currency?
ECIS Proceedings. Next, in Sections 3—7, we give a synthesis of the extracted data. Publication trend per year for SLRs and surveys as well as primary studies. We list them in chronological order and discuss their relation to our work. For security assurance, the authors identify the three categories environment security, vulnerability scanning and performance impacts, whereas correctness verification is subdivided into program correctness and formal verification.
The paper mentions various tools in each category, but does not compare them directly. The authors conclude that methods for formally verifying correctness are an effective way to ensure smart contract credibility and accuracy. Rouhani and Deters conduct a systematic review regarding the security, performance and applications of smart contracts, finally considering 90 papers.
They describe the security issues and present methods and tools to analyze them. The authors identify four major security problems, namely transaction order dependence, timestamp dependence, mishandled exceptions, and reentrancy. They evaluate nine vulnerability analysis tools and summarize methods for formal verification as well as for the detection of effective callback free objects. Zeli Wang et al.
The methods for detecting vulnerabilities are described at a high level, divided into static analysis including symbolic execution and formal verification , dynamic analysis and code similarity. The authors describe individual tools, but neither perform a comprehensive evaluation nor map vulnerabilities to the detection methods.
Singh et al. The most common approach is the verification of security properties by theorem proving, whereas symbolic execution and model checking are frequently used to establish functional correctness. Further formal techniques comprise formal modeling, finite state machines, logic based approaches, behavioral modeling, formal reasoning and formal specification languages.
The authors provide a mapping between formal techniques and the addressed issues in smart contracts. Moreover, they identify 15 formal tools and frameworks and relate them to the formal methods used. Tolmach et al. They present a taxonomy of formal approaches, with the main categories being modeling formalisms, specification formalisms, and verification techniques. Modeling formalisms are contract-level models, such as process algebras, state-transition systems and set-based methods, as well as program-level models, like abstract syntax tree analysis, control-flow automata and program logics.
Specification formalisms are divided into formal specifications such as contract and program-level specifications, as well as properties by domain, like security, privacy, finance, social games and asset tracking. The verification techniques comprise model checking, theorem proving, program verification, symbolic and concolic execution, runtime verification, and testing. In total, the survey describes 34 verification tools and frameworks and associates them with the respective formalism.
In their conclusion, the authors state that there is still a lack in clear approaches and standards with respect to secure development and analysis techniques. Furthermore, they argue that different blockchains and smart contract platforms often require different approaches to security analysis. Recently, this survey has been published as Tolmach et al.
Kim and Ryu give a survey of the analysis of smart contract for various blockchains, based on 67 out of initial papers. Of these, 24 papers use static analysis for vulnerability detection, 24 static analysis for program correctness, and 19 use dynamic analysis. The approaches are further subdivided according to specific methods like symbolic execution, abstract interpretation, machine learning, fuzzing, runtime verification, and concolic testing.
The authors evaluate 27 tools regarding the ability to detect one or more of 19 vulnerabilities. They point out unsolved challenges such as program behavior and language ambiguities, and highlight promising research directions such as the design of new languages and type systems, and the use of machine learning. Hu et al. The parts most relevant to our work are the evaluation and classification of analysis methods and tools. The authors identify, describe, and classify 40 tools that are able to detect and analyze vulnerabilities.
Of these, 15 focus on the detection of specific vulnerabilities, while the others have a broader scope like identifying multiple vulnerabilities, verifying custom properties, or alerting to potential security risks. Additionally, the review presents 20 auxiliary tools, including frameworks and high level languages.
In their conclusion, the authors state that many tools are inefficient and require specific knowledge for defining security properties. They also notice a trade-off between accuracy and the coverage of multiple vulnerabilities. Vacca et al. The survey is based on 96 articles, published between and , on the analysis and the testing of smart contracts, on metrics for and security of smart contracts, on Dapp performance and on blockchain applications.
The work summarizes the properties and application areas of 26 tools for the automated analysis of smart contracts. Moreover, the review describes experimental datasets and 18 empirical validations. The authors emphasize the need for guidelines and further research regarding the development and testing of smart contracts. Automated analysis is covered in varying degrees, but is not at the center. Vulnerabilities are described in one review, a taxonomy is suggested by two. Most SLRs include a description of the methods found, but usually without indicating the vulnerabilities that can be tackled by the methods.
Tool descriptions are more often included than not, while comparisons of tool properties are less frequent. The conclusions of the SLRs portray an immature field, in particular with respect to standards and guidelines, program behavior, tool efficiency, and testing. This situation and the marked increase in publications warrants regular reviews of the state of the art.
Naturally, our review includes more recent research, up to January , as it was conducted later than the other SLRs. What sets our work apart is its specific scope, its breadth, and rigor. Our main focus is automated vulnerability detection, including tools, taxonomies and benchmarks. Section 2. We start with our consolidated taxonomy of the vulnerabilities identified in the body of literature. Then we summarize classifications by scholars and present two community taxonomies. Finally, we present a mapping of our consolidated taxonomy to the community classifications.
In the reviewed literature, the term vulnerability is used in a broader sense than is common in computer security. It refers to a weakness or limitation of a smart contract that may result in security problems. A vulnerability allows for the execution of a smart contract in unintended ways. This includes locked or stolen resources, breaches of confidentiality or data integrity, and state changes in the environment of smart contracts that were not anticipated by developers or users and that put some involved party at an advantage or disadvantage.
The Supplementary Material contains a short description for each, including references. Our consolidated classification in Table 6 consists of 10 classes of vulnerabilities. It is based on 17 systematically selected surveys as documented in the supplement and two popular community classifications presented below. Consolidated taxonomy of vulnerabilities of smart contracts on Ethereum.
Luu et al. They define the vulnerabilities and present code snippets, examples of attacks, and affected real live smart contracts. To fix some problems, they propose improvements to the operational semantics of Ethereum, namely guarded transactions countering TOD , deterministic timestamps and enhanced exception handling. Atzei et al.
At the top, vulnerabilities are classified according to where they appear: in the source code usually Solidity , at machine level in the bytecode or related to instruction semantics , or at blockchain level. A mapping to actual examples of attacks and vulnerable smart contracts completes the taxonomy. Although this work is referenced in several other papers, we have found some issues and inconsistencies regarding the classification of concrete vulnerabilities.
For example, the vulnerability type called unpredictable state is illustrated by an example that is viewed in most other work as an instance of transaction order dependency. At the same time another example for problems associated with dynamic libraries is assigned to the same class. It can be argued that these two examples exhibit different vulnerabilities, as the underlying causes are inherently different.
Dika extends the taxonomy of Atzei et al. Grishchenko et al. If a bytecode satisfies such a property, it is provably free of the corresponding vulnerabilities. As the properties usually are too complex to be established automatically, the authors consider simpler criteria that imply the properties.
The project neither defines the listed vulnerabilities nor explains how the vulnerabilities were selected and ranked. Several studies like Durieux et al. Currently, the registry holds 36 vulnerabilities, with descriptions, references, suggestions for remediation and sample Solidity contracts. While several taxonomies build on the early classification of Atzei et al. EVM vs. Solidity or cause vs. So far, none of the taxonomies has seen wide adoption.
Table 7 maps our ten classes, omitting vulnerabilities that have no counterpart in the other taxonomies. We find a correspondence for 34 vulnerabilities, while 20 vulnerabilities documented in literature remain uncovered. Mapping of classifications for vulnerabilities. The mapping is not exact in the sense that categories in the same line of the table may overlap only partially.
SWC covers a range of 36 vulnerabilities, but 22 of our categories are missing. Both community classifications seem inactive: SWC was last updated in March , and the DASP 10 website with the first iteration of the project is dated For other summaries, differing in breadth and depth, see the surveys Almakhour et al.
We discuss four groups of methods: static code analysis, dynamic code analysis, formal specification and verification, and miscellany. The distinction between static analysis and formal methods is to some extent arbitrary, as the latter are mostly used in a static context. Moreover, methods like symbolic execution regularly use formal methods as a black box.
A key difference is the aspiration of formal methods to be rigorous, requiring correctness and striving for completeness. In this sense abstract interpretation should be rather considered a formal method, but it resembles symbolic execution and therefore is presented there. The analysis starts either from the source or the machine code of the contract. In most cases, the aim is to identify code patterns that indicate vulnerabilities.
Some tools also compute input data to trigger the suspected vulnerability and check whether the attack has been effective, thereby eliminating false positives. To put the various methods into perspective, we take a closer look at the process of compiling a program from a high-level language like Solidity to machine code Aho et al. The sequence of characters first becomes a stream of lexical tokens comprising e.
The parser transforms the linear stream of tokens into an abstract syntax tree AST and performs semantic checks. Now several rounds of code analysis, code optimization, and code instrumentation may take place, with the output in each round again in IR. This last step linearizes any hierarchical structures left, by arranging code fragments into a sequence and by converting control flow dependencies to jump instructions.
Such representations are readily available when starting from source code, as AST and IR are by-products of compilation. This approach is fast, but lacks accuracy if a vulnerability cannot be adequately characterized by such patterns.
Recovering a control flow graph CFG from machine code is inherently more complex. Its nodes correspond to the basic blocks of a program. A basic block is a sequence of instructions executed linearly one after the other, ending with the first instruction that potentially alters the flow of control, must notably conditional and unconditional jumps.
Nodes are connected by a directed edge if the corresponding basic blocks may be executed one after the other. The reachability of code is difficult to determine, as indirect jumps retrieve the target address from a register or the stack, where it has been stored by an earlier computation. Backward slicing resolves many situations by tracking down the origins of the jump targets. If this fails, the analysis has the choice between over- and under-approximation, by either treating all blocks as potential successors or by ignoring the undetectable successors.
Some tools go on by transforming the CFG and a specification of the vulnerability to a restricted form of Horn Logic called DataLog, which is not computationally universal, but admits efficient reasoning algorithms see e.
Soufle, Starting from the CFG, decompilation attempts to reverse also the other phases of the compilation process, with the aim to obtain source from machine code. The result is intended for manual inspection by humans, as it usually is not fully functional and does not compile. Any operation on such symbols results in a symbolic expression that is passed to the next operation.
In the case of a fork, all branches are explored, but they are annotated with complementary symbolic conditions that restrict the symbols to those values that will lead to the execution of the particular branch. At intervals, an SMT Satisfiability Modulo Theory solver is invoked to check whether the constraints on the current path are still simultaneously satisfiable.
If they are contradictory, the path does not correspond to an actual execution trace and can be skipped. Otherwise, exploration continues. When symbolic execution reaches code that matches a vulnerability pattern, a potential vulnerability is reported.
If, in addition, the SMT solver succeeds in computing a satisfying assignment for the constraints on the path, it can be used to devise an exploit that verifies the existence of the vulnerability. The effectiveness of symbolic execution is limited by several factors. First, the number of paths grows exponentially with depth, so the analysis has to stop at a certain point.
Second, some aspects of the machine are difficult to model precisely, like the relationship between storage and memory cells, or complex operations like hash functions. Third, SMT solvers are limited to certain types of constraints, and even for these, the evaluation may time out instead of detecting un satisfiability. Symbolic execution of the same path then yields formal constraints characterizing the path.
After negating some constraint, the SMT solver searches for a satisfying assignment. Using it as the input for the next cycle leads, by construction, to the exploration of a new path. This way, concolic execution achieves a better coverage of the code. Propagation rules define how tags are transformed by the instructions. Some vulnerabilities can be identified by inspecting the tags arriving at specific code locations. Taint analysis is often used in combination with other methods, like symbolic execution.
They may report vulnerabilities where there are none false positives, unsoundness , and may fail to detect vulnerabilities present in the code false negatives, incompleteness. The first limitation arises from the inability to specify necessary conditions for the presence of vulnerabilities that can be effectively checked. The second one is a consequence of the infeasibly large number of computation paths to explore, and the difficulty to come up with sufficient conditions that can be checked.
Abstract interpretation Cousot and Cousot, aims at completeness by focusing on properties that can be evaluated for all execution traces. As an example, abstract interpretation may split the integer range into the three groups zero, positive, and negative values. Instead of using symbolic expressions to capture the precise result of instructions, abstract interpretation reasons about how the property of belonging to one of the three groups propagates with each instruction.
This way it may be possible to show that the divisors in the code always belong to the positive group, ruling out division by zero, for any input. The challenge is to come up with a property that is strong enough to entail the absence of a particular vulnerability, but weak enough to allow for the exploration of the search space. Contrary to symbolic execution and most other methods, this approach does not indicate the presence of a vulnerability, but proves that a contract is definitely free from a certain vulnerability safety guarantee.
The most common method is testing, where the code is run with selected inputs and its output is compared to the expected result. Fuzzing is a technique that runs a program with a large number of randomized inputs, in order to provoke crashes or otherwise unexpected behavior.
Code instrumentation augments the program with additional instructions that check for abnormal behavior or monitor performance during runtime. An attempt to exploit a vulnerability then may trigger an exception and terminate execution. As an example, a program could be systematically extended by assertions ensuring that arithmetic operations do not cause an overflow.
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